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THE ISLAMIC HOLY PLACES AS A POLITICAL
BARGAINING CARD (1993 - 1995)
Menachem Klein*
Jerusalem is not only a Holy City in the religious sense, but also in a
national-political sense: it is the capital of the State of Israel, and the
capital-to-be of the Palestinians. In addition, East Jerusalem, which
Israel occupied and annexed in 1967, draws the religious aspirations of
the Islamic peoples, and the national and leadership interests of the Arab
nations led by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco. Although
both religion and politics infuse the issue of Jerusalem, politics has tran-
scended religion. Traditionally, religious issues do not dictate diplomatic
processes on a national level; rather, it is the politicians who manipulate
the holiness of Jerusalem for the glorification of their own country and
people, or use politics to mitigate and regulate religious conflicts.
Consequently, Jerusalem is not merely a religious issue but a combina-
tion of the religious and political. This combination of religion and poli-
tics sharpens and enhances the complexity and sensitivity of the issue,
especially when the issue is the future sovereignty of East Jerusalem. The
Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles of September 1993 stated
that sovereignty over East Jerusalem will be determined in the frame-
work of the permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Au-
thority.1 But politics by nature cannot abide a vacuum, and both sides
are endeavoring to strengthen their hold on the City in anticipation of the
commencement of negotiations for a permanent settlement in mid-1996.
This paper will attempt to illustrate the religious-political complexity of
Jerusalem by analyzing the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian relationship con-
* Dr. Menachem Klein is a research fellow at the Begin-Sudat Center for Strategic
Studies and a lecturer in the department of political science in Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
He has published several monographs and articles about the PLO's policy and ideology.
The author currently is preparing an expanded and updated edition of his book, THE JERU-
SALEM QUESTION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: ARAB STANDS (Jerusa-
lem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1995, in Hebrew). This book will be
published by The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies in both English and Hebrew.
1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September
13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1527 (entered into force Oct. 13, 1993).
[hereinafter Declaration of Principles] (focusing goal of interim agreement on ultimate
negotiations for permanent settlement).
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cerning the Islamic Holy Places on the Temple Mount, in light of the
peace agreements. Within a relatively short time, from summer 1994 un-
til mid-winter 1995, the Islamic Holy Places became a political card
played by all parties to the peace negotiations between Israel and the
Arab countries. The players in the main game form a triangle comprising
of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Israel and Jordan, each for its own reasons, have sought jointly to weaken
the Palestinian position. But the PLO-Palestinian Authority has mobil-
ized the aid of Arab states, chiefly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco,
that wish to weaken Jordan and to deny it sole or preferential authority
over the Holy Places on the Temple Mount. The involvement of those
Arab states has manifested itself in the framework of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference, and the backing among Arab states of the PLO-
Palestinian Authority has redefined the bilateral relations between the
PLO and Jordan.
The linguistic differences between Hebrew and Arabic in the designa-
tion of the Arab eastern area of Jerusalem are not devoid of political
influence and intent. Arabs tend to emphasize that this area is populated
mostly by Arabic-speaking Palestinians. Their official documents refer to
it as "Arabic Jerusalem," so as to differentiate it from Hebrew-speaking
West Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Israelis use the term "East Jerusalem"
to denote the eastern part of the indivisible entity of Jerusalem. It is nat-
ural that the dispute between two national entities about such a contro-
versial subject would infiltrate their languages, especially as there is
broad consensus within each about the problem of Jerusalem. I have
therefore followed two rules about the designation of the City: (1) in texts
translated from Arabic, its name appears as written in the original. I pre-
fer to translate the expression, "al-Quds al-Sharif," which frequently ap-
pears in Palestinian texts, as Honorable Jerusalem, in order to
differentiate it from "al-Madina al-Maqdasa" (The Holy City), which also
sometimes appears in Palestinian texts. (2) I have also used the common
Hebrew expressions, "East Jerusalem" and "eastern Jerusalem." In
short, usage of a certain designation for the Arab-eastern area of Jerusa-
lem was not chosen out of political preference, but from recognition of
social and linguistic reality. Language has a life and routine of its own,




I. THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION AND THE PEACE TREATY
BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL
The Israeli-Jordanian peace talks culminated in the Washington Decla-
ration, signed by Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and King Hussein of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on July 25th, 1994.2 One of the Declara-
tion's clauses relates to the Holy Places in Jerusalem. This clause, later
copied in substantially similar language into the Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty of September 1994, confirmed Palestinian apprehensions about Is-
raeli activities in Jerusalem, and has rekindled discord between the PLO
and Jordan. The Washington Declaration states that:
Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When ne-
gotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will
give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.
In addition the two sides have agreed to act together to promote
interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions.'
Curiously, this clause did not appear in the Agreement of Principles
which King Hussein and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were
about to sign on November 2, 1993, although that Agreement generally is
similar to the Washington Declaration.4 This clause was formulated per-
sonally by Rabin and Hussein, with the purpose of separating the discus-
sion of the political sovereignty over Jerusalem from the rise of the
religious status of the Holy Places. To quote King Hussein in his speech
before the United States Congress:
My religious faith demands that sovereignty over the holy places
in Jerusalem reside with God and God alone. Dialogue between
the faiths should be strengthened; religious sovereignty should
be accorded to all believers of the three Abrahamic faiths, in
accordance with their religions. In this way, Jerusalem will be-
come the symbol of peace and its embodiment, as it must be for
2. Douglas Jehl, Jordan and Israel Join in Pact Aimed at Broad Mideast Peace, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1994, at Al, see Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994,
Isr.-Jordan, 34 I.L.M. 43, 46 [hereinafter Israeli-Jordanian Agreement](citing Washington
Declaration in Preamble).
3. HA'ARETZ, July 26, 1994; FBIS, Daily Report, July 26, 1994; see Israeli-Jordanian
Agreement, supra note 2, at 50 (stressing access to Jerusalem's Religious and historical
areas); see also Text of Washington Declaration Signed by Jordan and Israel, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1994, at A8; Youssef M. Ibrahim, Confirmation of Jordan As Guardian of Shrines,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1994, at A8 (noting Israel's Jordanian preference in resolving jurisdic-
tional dispute over Jerusalem).
4. HA'ARETZ, Nov. 23, 1994 (revealing details of this agreement for the first time); cf.
Declaration of Principles, supra note 1, at 1527-42.
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both Palestinians and Israelis when their negotiations determine
the final status of Arab East Jerusalem. 5
Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan was more open and direct. He stated
that Jordan had never, and would never, relinquish its responsibility over
the Islamic Holy Places in eastern Jerusalem. In his view, one must do
everything to separate the religious and political issues of eastern Jerusa-
lem, not only in the interim period but also in the permanent agreement.
This would include even separate divisions of Jerusalem for religious and
political purposes. In the permanent agreement, political sovereignty
would be held by the Palestinians when they attain it, but religious sover-
eignty would be in the hands of a pan-Islamic Council in which both
Palestinians and Jordanians would participate. "What is needed to all re-
ligions is a fair distribution of the moral-religious heritage."6
Thus, in the Washington Declaration, Israel has undertaken an initial
commitment about the permanent status of Jerusalem. The terms of the
Washington Declaration suggest that Israel has relinquished any claim to
actualize sovereignty over the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem, and has
surrendered the Temple Mount as a religious site. Israel claims that its
paramount interest is to guarantee its political sovereignty over the east-
ern city, and that management of the Islamic Holy Places and their reli-
gious status is not part of their political sovereignty.
Furthermore, in the Washington Declaration, Israel officially recog-
nized for the first time Jordan's special status in regard to the Islamic holy
shrines in Jerusalem. Historically and traditionally, the administration of
the Islamic Waqf (religious endowment) has been responsible for these
holy shrines. The Islamic Waqf of Jerusalem remained subordinate to
Jordan even after the Israeli conquest of 1967, and even the severance of
Jordan's legal and administrative ties to the West Bank in July 1988 did
not alter this subordination. The Hashemites have developed a special
attachment to the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem, and have derived
from the shrines much of the legitimacy for their rule and political sur-
vival.7 But until the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, Jordan maintained this role
by virtue of continuation of the past state of affairs, and not by choice or
conscious preference about the future. Finally, the Washington Declara-
tion establishes the possibility for future application of the option for the
5. 140 Cong. Rec. H6204, H6205 (daily ed. July 26, 1994); HA'ARETZ, July 27, 1994;
FBIS, July 27, 1994.
6. HA'ARETZ, July 20, 1994; DAVAR, Nov. 2, 1994, at B2.
7. In the framework of this commitment, Hussein refurbished the golden dome of the
Dome of the Rock in 1994. See David Hoffman, Fete in Amman Marks Restoration of
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1994, at All (describing dedication
ceremony and personal contribution of Hussein).
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expropriation of the Holy Places in Jerusalem from any religious
sovereignty.
Adnan Abu Odeh, the former Jordanian Prime Minister as well as
King Hussein's confidant, suggested, possibly with the King's knowledge,
that the old city of Jerusalem (inside the walls) should be expropriated
from political sovereignty and regarded as a Holy Place. A joint Jewish-
Muslim-Christian council would administer the site, and each religion
would have custody of its own shrines.8
Although Abu Odeh's proposal did not elicit any response from Israel
at the time, in the aftermath of the Oslo agreements, Israel has adopted
the Jordanian tendency to separate the political future of Jerusalem from
the future of the Holy Places. Since 1967, Israel has aspired to retain
political sovereignty over East Jerusalem and to accord its actions a pan-
Arab, pan-Islamic, and international legitimacy. In return for Jordan's
8. Adnan Abu Odeh, Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem, 71 FOREIGN AFFs.,
Spring 1992, at 183, 185. Abu Odeh stated:
[One must] draw a distinction between the ancient walled city and the areas
outside the walls .... [Tjhe main holy places of three religions are clearly
marked, distinct and known: the Church of the Holy Sepulcher for Christians, the
Wailing Wall for Jews, and the Dome of the Rock and Al Aqsa Mosque for Mus-
lims. All three shrines are located within the ancient walled city. Around these
shrines have grown up over the years quarters inhabited by the followers of each
religion, all believers in one God .... [E]ach quarter has cultural characteristics
separate and distinct from the others. Over time a shade and degree of holiness
has been extended to these quarters of the walled city surrounding the shrines
themselves. Beyond that, however, it is stretching the point to call "holy" every
building, every neighborhood and every street corner that has been built up
around the walled city, extending out many kilometers in some directions ....
It is hard to find either religious or historical justification for a refusal to com-
promise on the areas of Arab Jerusalem that lie outside the walled old city but
still within present municipal boundaries .... The walled city, the true and holy
Jerusalem, would belong to no single nation or religion. Rather, it would belong
to the whole world and to the three religions: Muslim, Christian and Jewish. Thus
no state would have political sovereignty over it .... [T]he urban areas that
stretch beyond the ancient walls to the east, northeast and southeast, the Arab
part of the city ... would be called Al Quds, the name used by the Arabs and
Muslims.... [Tihe urban areas that stretch beyond the walls to the west, north-
west and southwest ... would be called Yerushalaim, the name used by Jews.
The Palestinian flag would be raised in Al Quds and the Israeli flag would fly
over Yerushalaim. Over the walled city of Jerusalem, however, no flags would
fly.... The holy walled city of Jerusalem would be open to all.... It would be
governed by a council representing the highest Muslim, Christian and Jewish reli-
gious authorities. Each authority would be responsible for running and maintain-
ing the holy sites of its faith .... Administrative details of the spiritual city of
Jerusalem would be left to creative minds in negotiations.
Id. at 185-88; see also HA'ARETZ, Apr. 23, 1992. Abu Odeh was writing prior to the Oslo
Accord and before PLO leaders agreed to discuss a special status for the new quarters in
Jerusalem, distinct from the settlements.
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agreement to separate political and religious questions regarding Jerusa-
lem, Rabin was willing to endorse Jordan's special religious status over
the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem. 9 In effect, Jordan received from
Israel a foothold in the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem by excluding
Israel from them, while Israel strengthened its position that the existence
of Islamic Holy Places in East Jerusalem does not in itself eviscerate
Israel's political sovereignty over the City. One must emphasize that, in
the Washington Declaration, Israel and Jordan did not adopt fully Abu
Odeh's position, but merely one of his guiding principles: the separation
of political from religious sovereignty. Abu Odeh did not advocate for
Jordan a preferential position in the administration of the Holy Places;
nor did he intend to accord even indirect legitimacy to Israel's political
hold over East Jerusalem. Rather Abu Odeh intended to oust Israel from
its political hold. This also guided his reference to the new quarters that
Israel built in eastern Jerusalem outside the walls as "settlements." The
Washington Declaration went further than Abu Odeh's plan. This Decla-
ration embodied Jordanian-Israeli cooperation, which clearly would
weaken the Palestinian position in their struggle to establish eastern Jeru-
salem as their capital.
As expected, the Palestinians did not accept the Washington Declara-
tion. PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat accused Israel of violating the Israeli-
Palestinian Declaration of Principles, and added that the Palestinians de-
mand the accelerated commencement of negotiations over the future of
Jerusalem. Arafat stated that "[o]ur right to Jerusalem is not embodied
by raising a flag on the Dome of the Rock or the Church of the Holy
Sepulcher. It is a sovereign right, a territorial issue, and a historical and
legitimate right that cannot be given up."1 °
Did Israel really violate the agreement with the PLO? Two Israeli ju-
rists argued that Israel did not violate the agreement on four grounds:
First, Jordan was not named as partner to the negotiations over the per-
manent agreement, and the agreement with Jordan cannot substantially
influence the results of the negotiations over the permanent status of Je-
rusalem. Israel merely resolved that, in future negotiations, Jordan's
present role in the Holy Places would be given a priority. Second, the
9. This, in spite of the fact that Rabin unofficially expressed his wish to discuss the
future of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem with more than one Arab partner. Rabin in a
background interview, HA'ARETZ, July 27, 1994.
10. FBIS, July 27, 1994; see also HA'ARETZ, Aug. 2, 1994, at 1A; Ibrahim, supra note 3,
at A8 (discussing Arafat's visible agitation by Israel's invitation to King Hussein to pray at
Al Aksa and his assertions that sites remain under Palestinian control); David Makovsky,
Arafat: My Duty to Invite Hussein, JERUSALEM POST, July 22, 1994, at IA (noting Arafat's
statement that Palestinians have jurisdiction over the Holy City).
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agreement with Jordan does not bind the PLO and does not violate Pales-
tinian rights, but indicates Israeli priorities in its negotiations with the
PLO. Third, the agreement with Jordan refers to the permanent status,
while the commitment to the PLO assures observance of the status quo.
Fourth, Israel's agreement with the PLO determines only the timetable
for discussions about Jerusalem, and nothing else. At most, the agree-
ment with Jordan deviates from Palestinian expectations. 1
Rabin and Hussein carefully worded the paragraph about Jerusalem in
the Washington Declaration so that the Palestinians legally could not
claim that it violates any Israeli commitment toward them. Yet, the Dec-
laration suggested Jordan's indirect acceptance of Israel's political sover-
eignty over East Jerusalem.' 2 Even if Israel did not violate its agreement
with the PLO from a legal or literal viewpoint, a political breach unmis-
takably occurred. Israel neither acted in good faith, nor followed the
path established by its Declaration of Principles with the PLO. Israel
wanted to exploit its contacts with Jordan to influence the permanent sta-
tus of Jerusalem, while weakening the Palestinian claim to sovereignty
over East Jerusalem.
The Washington Declaration naturally incensed the PLO, which the
Palestinians interpreted as an Israeli attempt to marginalize the Palestin-
ian Authority. Moreover, according to the PLO, political sovereignty
must be in the hands of the Palestinians; they must decide the future of
the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem. The Palestinians can contemplate
no separation of political and religious sovereignty over the Islamic Holy
Places, especially since Palestinian claims to political sovereignty in east-
ern Jerusalem are based largely on the religious status of the Temple
Mount (Haram Al-Sharif) in Islam. Therefore, the PLO viewed the
treaty between Israel and Jordan as an attempt to cut the ground from
under its feet in Jerusalem. The PLO interpreted this treaty as a deal
under which Jordan was willing to accept Israel's political sovereignty in
eastern Jerusalem in return for placing the Islamic Holy Places, after be-
ing exclusively under Israeli rule in the interim agreement, dominantly in
Jordanian hands. Arafat remarked that "[n]o Arab or Israeli leader con-
trols the holy Shrines in eastern Jerusalem. This right is the Palestinians'
11. HA'ARETZ, Aug. 4, 1994; Jon Immanuel & Bill Hutman, Arafat Suggests Hussein
Head Confederation, JERUSALEM. POST, Aug. 4, 1994, at 1 (explaining that according to
Peace Watch, a group monitoring the Israeli-PLO accord, Israel did not violate its agree-
ments with the PLO by signing the Washington Declaration).
12. HA'ARETZ, Nov. 23, 1994. Text of Washington Declaration, supra note 3, at A8
(citing text of Washington Declaration in full, which contains provision that acknowledges
Israel's authority to give priority to one country over another country).
19961
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alone."' 3 Reacting to Israel's invitation to King Hussein to visit and pray
in Jerusalem, Arafat declared that he alone was entitled to issue such an
invitation for prayer in Jerusalem. Arafat mobilized the Supreme Islamic
Council, headed by Hasan Tahbub, to announce that it was the only body
responsible for the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem.' 4
In response, King Hussein stated that the PLO's emphasis on the Holy
Places issue was motivated by its need to cover up its inability to extract
sovereignty from Israel over the Temple Mount or establish a Palestinian
state with Jerusalem as its capital. Hussein assured the PLO that he had
no wish to challenge its role as political representative of the Palestinians.
Although Jordan surprised the PLO by reaching a treaty with Israel, Hus-
sein claimed that the PLO failed to consult Jordan over its secret negotia-
tions with Israel which led to the Oslo accord.15 Hussein tried to appease
the PLO by stating that separation between the political and the religious
question of the future of Jerusalem could not harm political negotiations
between the PLO and Israel, nor threaten the PLO's political status as
sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
Since the signing of the Washington Declaration, several attempts have
been made to reconcile Jordan and the PLO. Crown Prince Hassan
stated in November 1994:
In the final status, when responsibility is transferred in full to
the Palestinians, this responsibility (for the sites) will be trans-
ferred in full to those concerned. We cannot accept that we
would one day have to relinquish the Arab and Islamic identity
except to an Arab Palestinian identity ... we promise to hand
over trusteeship of the holy sites to the Palestinian Authority. 16
Hassan tried to convince the Palestinians that Jordan, by extracting the
Islamic Holy Places from Israel's hold, was acting as an envoy of the
Arab and Islamic world, thereby serving the Palestinian interest.
Prime Minster Al-Majali's tone was even more plain: "On the day
when Israel's political sovereignty over Jerusalem ends and the brother
13. HA'ARETZ, July 27, 1994, at A4.
14. HA'ARETZ, July 25, 1994.
15. HA'ARETZ, Aug. 22, 1994, at B2 (Interview with DER SPIEGEL); Declaration of
Principles, supra note 1, at 1527-42.
16. FBIS, Nov. 3, 1994; see Christopher Walker, PLO Hails Jordan's Pledge on Jerusa-
lem Holy Sites, THE TiMEs (London), Nov. 2, 1994, at 15 (discussing Prince Hassan's state-
ments); see also Majali Explains Jordan's Stand on Jerusalem, Rejects Criticism of Treaty,
JORDAN TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994 (quoting Prime Minister Abdul Salam Majali that "Jordan
would seriously consider transferring the religious custody over the Islamic holy places in




Palestinians take over that sovereignty, we will seriously consider aban-
doning Jordanian jurisdiction (over the Holy Places)."' 7
By conditioning relinquishment of rights over the Holy Places to the
Palestinians on the achievement of Palestinian political sovereignty, Al-
Majali established a higher threshold than Crown Prince Hassan, condi-
tioning transfer on Israeli acquiescence. Al-Majali's approach reflects his
doubt as to whether the Palestinians will be able to oust Israel from east-
ern Jerusalem.
In early December 1994, Faisal al-Husseini, who deals with Jerusalem
for the Palestinian Authority, visited Jordan to settle differences concern-
ing Jerusalem, and to prepare ground for an official visit by Arafat to
Jordan. At the end of his visit, he said:
We know full well that the holy places have been placed under
Jordanian administrative guardianship. This situation has been
recognized and accepted by Israel since 1967. We are not inter-
ested now in changing this situation. We agreed to discuss the
status of Jerusalem with Israel in the second stage. We are not
ready to open this file before the beginning of the official talks.
Therefore, we believe that Jordan considers the holy places a
trust that will be turned over to the Palestinians when they be-
come capable of shouldering this responsibility. We agreed to
maintain the situation as it is and to hold further coordination so
that we will not make any wrong moves .... The matter is not
one of sensitivities toward the Jordanian stand. However, in the
absence of coordination, even the steps that are taken with good
intentions might be misinterpreted by this or that party.' 8
Thus, both sides have agreed that the Palestinian Authority will recog-
nize the status quo existing in Jerusalem since 1967, including Jordanian
guardianship of the Islamic Holy Places in the City. In return, the
Jordanian authorities will undertake to regard this guardianship over
these places as a trust that transfers to the Palestinians when the latter is
in a position to accept it. It is not clear whether Husseini received a man-
date from Arafat to reach this agreement, which seems nearer to the
Jordanian position than the Palestinian position. Arafat did not ratify
this agreement, and his visit to Jordan did not take place in early Decem-
ber 1994, as planned. Instead, Arafat relocated arbitration between him-
self and Hussein to a new arena, the Organization of the Islamic
Conference.
17. FBIS, Oct. 31, 1994.
18. HA'ARETZ, Dec. 5, 1994; FBIS Dec. 5, 1994.
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II. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION,
DECEMBER 1994 - JANUARY 1995
The seventh meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC or the Conference) was held in Casablanca, Morocco, in December
1994.19 An open discussion between Jordan and the Palestinian Author-
ity over the Holy Places in Jerusalem ultimately disintegrated. Jordan,
supported by Qattar, Oman, and Yemen, demanded that the closing
statement of the Conference extol its role as guardian of the Holy Places
and congratulated King Hussein on his interest in the Holy Places in Jeru-
salem. In his effort to mobilize the leaders of Islamic countries, King
Hussein claimed that as soon as Israel and the Palestinians reach a final
agreement on the permanent status of Jerusalem, Jordan would relin-
quish to the Palestinians guardianship of the Holy Places in the City. But
the PLO, supported by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco, recognized
Jordan's political intent and refused. The Palestinians claimed that the
clause dealing with this issue in the Jordan-Israel treaty is a stumbling-
block to their achieving sovereignty in eastern Jerusalem and Israel's
withdrawal. Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the PLO even tried to
convince the assembly to form a committee on behalf of the OIC, which
would assume guardianship over the Holy Places from Jordan until the
Palestinian Authority has full responsibility over Jerusalem. When he
could not achieve a majority among the assembly for recognizing Jordan's
role in guarding the Holy Places until the permanent agreement is
reached, King Hussein left the Conference before it ended. For the first
time since the founding of the OIC in 1972, the Conference lacked con-
sensus over its resolutions, which were adopted over Jordanian
opposition.2 °
In the closing statement, the Conference "emphasizes again that the
problem of Palestine and of Honorable Jerusalem is the fundamental
problem for all Muslims, and they identify with the PLO in its just strug-
gle for the removal of every vestige of Israeli occupation and building
Palestinian institutions on Palestinian land.",21 Furthermore, it stated that
members of the OIC:
19. In response to the al-Aqsa fire, the first Islamic Summit was held in Rabat, Mo-
rocco, in 1969. This was followed in 1970 by the first Islamic Foreign Minister's Confer-
ence in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the formation of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1972. The OIC gathered together all Muslim states, headed
by King Hassan II of Morocco. See JOHN C. EsPosrro, Islam and Politics 159 (1984). For
a discussion of the pre-statehood period, see MARTIN KRAMER, ISLAM ASSSEMBLED - THE
ADVENT OF THE MUSLIM CONGRESSES (1986).
20. AL-QUDS, Dec. 15, 1994, at 1, 21; AL-WASSAT, Dec. 19, 1994, at 17.
21. AL-QUDS, Dec. 16, 1994, at 1, 23; HA'ARETZ, Dec. 22, 1994, Jan. 2, 1995.
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must assist the PLO in its future negotiations, until all authority
and sovereignty in the occupied territories-including Honorable
Jerusalem-will be transferred to the hands of the Palestinian Au-
thority, and to ensure the return of Jerusalem to Palestinian sov-
ereignty ... as Honorable Jerusalem is an inseparable part of
the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and are
subject to the same laws as the other occupied territories. Jeru-
salem must be returned to Palestinian sovereignty as it is the
capital of Palestine.22
Moreover, the statement stipulates that responsibility for Jerusalem in
the interim period must be handed over to the Palestinian Authority, and
completely disregards Jordan's role in the Holy Places. Hussein felt this
drift before he left the Conference and the assembly: "If you believe that
Jordan's role in Jerusalem is harmful and you prefer Islamic guardianship,
be it so. But you must then take responsibility for your decision."23
This statement emphasizes the political aspect. The ire of the strongest
Muslim countries in the Middle East was aroused, not so much by the
preferential religious status accorded to Jordan, but by the political impli-
cations of the Washington Declaration through which Jordan indirectly
has recognized the annexation of eastern Jerusalem to Israel. The debate
among Muslim countries over the Holy Places was held not over the reli-
gious issue, but over political sovereignty. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Mo-
rocco, and the PLO believed that the status of the Holy Places in
Jerusalem derives from political sovereignty over it. Therefore, if polit-
ical sovereignty remains with Israel, the Holy Places remain occupied.
Saudi Arabia even contributed to this argument that King Hussein's sep-
aration of religion and politics in Jerusalem is foreign to Islam. On Janu-
ary 16th, the Jerusalem Committee of the OIC convened in Morocco. In
its new composition, as initiated by Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
the PLO, the controlling members of the Conference finalized what they
had begun in the plenary session one month earlier.
The concluding statement of the Jerusalem Committee states:
I. At the international political level:
1. It reaffirms that just and comprehensive peace in the Middle
East region will not be realized except through the implementa-
tion of Security Council Resolutions Nos. 242, 338 and 425 and
the principle of land for peace, in order to guarantee Israel's
total withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab ter-
ritories to the 4th June 1967 lines, including the city of holy Jeru-
salem, Syrian Golan, and southern Lebanon, and to guarantee
22. AL-QUDS, Dec. 16, 1994, at 1, 21; HA'ARETZ, Dec. 22, 1994, Jan. 2, 1995.
23. AL-QUDS, Dec. 16, 1994, at 1, 21; HA'ARETZ, Dec. 22, 1994, Jan. 2, 1995.
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the realization of the national inalienable rights of the Palestin-
ian people, including its right to return and self-determination
and the establishment of its independent state on its national
soil, of which the capital city is holy Jerusalem.
2. It affirms that the holy city of Jerusalem is an indivisible part
of the Palestinian land occupied in 1967, and it underlines the
need for its return to Palestinian sovereignty as capital of the
State of Palestine.
3. It urges the Islamic nation to join efforts to support the Pal-
estinian right to the holy city of Jerusalem, and to back by vari-
ous means the positions of the PLO for the transfer of all
authorities and responsibilities in the Palestinian occupied land,
including Jerusalem, to the Palestinian National Authority.
4. It calls on the United Nations Security Council, and particu-
larly the two states sponsoring the [Madrid] Peace Conference,
to take the necessary measures to make Israel stop settlement-
building and the Judaization of Jerusalem, and not to undertake
any geographical or demographic alteration there, and to be
committed to the agreements and conventions concerning the
non-violation of Palestinian institutions and the Islamic and
Christian sacred places in Jerusalem in implementation of the
Security Council resolutions pertaining to this matter.
5. It demands that states must adhere to the U[nited] N[ations]
Security Council Resolution 478 of 1980 which stipulates that
diplomatic missions must not be moved to the holy city of Jeru-
salem. It reaffirms that all legislative, administrative and settle-
ment measures aimed at changing the holy city's legal status are
invalid and are in breach of international accords, charters, and
conventions, in accordance with the resolutions of international
legitimacy, including U[nited] N[ations] Security Council Reso-
lutions 465, 476, 478 of 1980, and the resolutions of the U[nited]
N[ations] General Assembly which demand the abolition of the
measures.
6. It condemns strongly the Israeli Knesset's resolution issued
on 26th December 1994 banning all activities of the Palestinian
institutions in the city of holy Jerusalem, demands that the inter-
national community must not recognize this resolution and must
urge Israel to revoke it.
7. It condemns the repeated Israeli attacks on the territory of
and the resultant casualties and destruction.
8. It appeals to H[is] M[ajesty] King Hassan II, the Monarch of
Morocco... to continue the contacts that he deems necessary at
the international level, and particularly with the member states
of the Security Council and the co-sponsors of the peace pro-
cess, the E[uropean] U[nion], the Vatican, and other Christian
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points of reference in order to win over the hoped for support
and backing for the recovery of the city of Jerusalem and to ex-
plain the dangers of Israeli practices and measures on the peace
process and on security and stability in the Middle East region.
9. It calls on the secretary general [of the OIC] to conduct the
necessary contacts with the regional and international organiza-
tions and the international specialized agencies with the aim of
studying adequate ways to preserve the civilized, cultural and
religious heritage in the holy city and to reinforce the steadfast-
ness of its population.
10. It has decided to set up a contact group at the level of per-
manent delegates of member-states of the committee at the
U[nited] N[ations] H[eadQuarters] in New York to follow up
the execution of its decisions and those of the Security Council
resolutions pertaining to holy Jerusalem.
II. At the level of supporting the holy city of Jerusalem:
11. It affirms the important role of the Jerusalem Fund in bol-
stering the resistance of the holy city and its institutions in the
face of the Israeli schemes, and it calls on the I[slamic]
C[onference] 0[rganization] member-states to pledge to cover
the capital of the Jerusalem Fund and its subsidiaries in order to
populate Jerusalem, build housing units there and refurbish its
old buildings so as to preserve the civilization and Islamic heri-
tage and bolster the resistance of the population.
12. It gives permission to the board of directors of the Jerusa-
lem Fund to exercise the powers stipulated in its statutes and
clauses 2, 3, and 8 of its law.
13. It welcomes the proposal made by H[is] M[ajesty] King
Hassan II, chairman of the Jerusalem Committee and of the
Seventh Islamic Summit, to establish the Holy Jerusalem Treas-
ury [Arabic: bayt mal] to order to save holy Jerusalem, protect
the Palestinians' right to it, support the steadfastness of its peo-
ple and safeguard its cultural, religious and architectural
heritage.
The Holy Jerusalem Treasury will be set up as an agency, the
objective of which will be to mobilize material and financial re-
sources from the OIC member-states, institutions, establish-
ments, the private sector, Islamic and Arab associations,
communities, and individuals.24
24. AL-QUDS, Jan. 18, 1995, at 1, 23; FBIS, Jan. 18, 1995; see also ICO Jerusalem Com-
mittee Meeting, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File.
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III. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
AND JORDAN
After the issue of the Holy Places was settled in favor of the Palestini-
ans, the door was open for Arafat to visit Jordan. On January 25, 1995,
Arafat arrived in Jordan to sign a memorandum of understanding and
cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan in the areas of communications, passage of goods and peo-
ple, banking, post, culture, education, and local administration. The
signing of these agreements was postponed until the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority and the signing of separate, detailed agreements
with Israel by Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. The agreements be-
tween Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were intended to regulate
bilateral relations between the Palestinian Authority and the Kingdom to
its east. Following the agreements, Jordan decided to establish a liaison
office in Gaza. As an introduction to the agreements signed, a political
document, "The Agreement For Cooperation and Coordination" states:
Based on the strong historic ties between the Jordanian and the
Palestinian peoples, to arrive at their common objectives and
interests in confirmation of the desire of the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan and Palestine to achieve the highest degree of
cooperation and coordination between them in all fields and in
expression of the common hopes and the supreme objectives,
the two sides have agreed on the need to crystallize a unified
strategy founded on the following bases:
1. The need for full and continuous effective coordination be-
tween the two sides to achieve the common objectives for the
benefit and good of the two fraternal peoples.
2. The that Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is special and
distinguished and constitutes a model that helps to strengthen
the nation's capabilities and build bridges of trust, cooperation
and understanding among its peoples, to fulfill its responsibility
and assume the status it deserves, especially under international
developments.
3. Jordan stresses its ceaseless support for the Palestinian peo-
ple under the PLO to arrive at their right to self-determination
on their national land and soil and establish their independent
state with holy Jerusalem, support for its capital. Also, the Pal-
estinian position to implement the Israeli-Palestinian Declara-
tion of Principles since it constitutes a step on the path of
realizing the Palestinian people's national rights.
4. Jordan will cooperate with the Palestinian [National] Au-
thority in all fields and provide it with the necessary expertise to
establish its national institutions that can assume their duties
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and responsibilities for the benefit of the fraternal Palestinian
people.
5. Both parties stress complete compliance with the concept of
peace that is based on the comprehensive solution based on in-
ternational legitimacy; U.N. Resolutions 424, 338, and 425; and
the regaining of all legitimate Arab rights.
6. Both parties will work jointly to spread the spirit of Arab
reconciliation and achieve Arab solidarity for the benefit of two
fraternal peoples and the entire Arab nation. This will
strengthen the chances for establishing the kind of peace that is
based on justice and development to bring good to the Arab
peoples, strengthen their common affiliation, and protect the in-
dividual's rights and dignity on his land.
7. Continuous cooperation and coordination in all regional
and world bodies to realize the interests of the two parties and
the supreme Arab interests in all fields.
8. The agreement that was signed between Jordan and Israel
on 26th October 1994 is an important step for Jordan to regain
its sovereign rights to its land, waters and borders, and to work
on guaranteeing the rights of the [(Palestinian)] refugees and
displaced people in accordance with resolutions of international
legitimacy. It also supports the other tracks of negotiations to
arrive at all legitimate Arab rights.
9. To arrive at all aspects of coordination and consultations
and to serve the interests of the two fraternal peoples, the two
sides believe that the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Higher Com-
mittee should be activated to follow up issues of mutual con-
cern, and adopt a suitable mechanism that would guarantee the
arrival at the interest of the two people through continuous and
direct contacts.25
This document neither indicates Jordan's special status in Jerusalem
nor deals directly with the Islamic Holy Places in the City. It states
clearly, however, the political sovereignty of the Palestinian people over
Jerusalem. The spirit of this document reflects an agreement between
two political entities of equal national status. The Palestinian side views
favorably the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel and states that this
treaty does not harm the other tracks of negotiations between Israel and
its neighbors. Other such tracks include Syria's efforts to regain sover-
eignty over the whole of the Golan Heights. This documents portrays the
Jordan-Israel peace treaty as ensuring Jordan's rights "on its land, water
25. AL-SHARK AL-AWSSAT, Jan. 27, 1995, at 3; AL-HAIAT,'Jan. 24, 1995, at 1, 4; see
also HA'ARETZ, Jan. 27, 1995; FBIS, Jan. 25,1995; "Text" of Document to Be Signed by
King Husayn [sic], Arafat on 25th January, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 26,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
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and borders, and toward securing the rights of the refugees," and does
not contradict the rights of the Palestinians. Jordan pledges, therefore, to
assist the Palestinian people and the PLO to realize their right of self-
determination and establish a state with Jerusalem as its capital. The doc-
ument implies that Jordan may not deter the Palestinians by differentiat-
ing between political sovereignty over Jerusalem and religious
sovereignty over the Holy Places within it. Specifically, the document
contains a clause in which Jordan pledges to cooperate with the Palestin-
ian Authority and to assist in establishing its national institutions. There-
fore, nothing in the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement confirms Jordan's
preferential status over the Holy Places in Jerusalem. Thus, one of the
outstanding clauses in the Jordan-Israel peace treaty disappeared com-
pletely in the agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Jordan.
The new situation, created by the OIC and later by the agreement with
the Palestinian Authority, was forced upon King Hussein, making it diffi-
cult for him to come to terms with it. Because the issue of Jerusalem
remains unresolved and will be discussed fully before establishing the
permanent peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians, the King
hopes to reverse this situation in time. In the signing ceremony of the
agreement with the Palestinian Authority, King Hussein said that his
country would continue to fulfill its duty and give its auspices to the Holy
Places in Jerusalem "as it did in the past."26 Jordan would do this "out of
its diligence to cherish these Holy Places and as a fulfillment of its obliga-
tion to guard Jerusalem and preserve its Arab and Muslim identity."27
We may judge the complexity and convolution that the issue of Jerusalem
presents to King Hussein from an interview he gave to Ibrahim Nafa,
editor of the Egyptian daily, 'Al-Ahram,' about one month after signing
the agreement with the Palestinian Authority:
I am responsible for the Arab sector of the city. This has been
stated with complete clarity by Resolution 242. However, in ac-
cordance with the Palestinian-Israeli agreement, the question of
Jerusalem is postponed until the final status negotiations ....
The objective must be clear: land in return for peace and the
restoration of Palestinian authority over the Palestinian soil.
Regarding Jerusalem, sir, its western part has been the capital of
Israel since it was established, regardless of the countries which
recognized this. However, the Arab side (of Jerusalem) could
be the symbol of peace between the two parties, and both par-
26. AL-HAIAT, Jan. 27, 1995, at 1, 4; AL-SHARK AL-AWSSAT, Jan. 27, 1995, at 3; see
also FBIS, Jan. 26, 1995.
27. AL-HAIAT, Jan. 27, 1995, at 1, 4; AL-SHARK AL-AWSSAT, Jan. 27, 1995, at 3; see
also FBIS, Jan. 26, 1995.
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ties would achieve the required situation in it. This might hap-
pen one day, God willing, as a result of the negotiations thanks
to the Palestinian efforts, Israel, or the efforts of others. The
issue of the holy lands is another topic of discussion. Once
again, I would like to reiterate that we, as Hashemites and
Jordanians, do not have any objection in or ambition toward Je-
rusalem. What took place was only an Israeli recognition, in the
Washington Declaration and then in the (Jordan-Israel peace)
treaty, that Jordan will continue its supervision during this pe-
riod. Whether or not this issue has been mentioned in the
Washington Declaration or elsewhere, this issue is sensitive for
us, as well as for the Islamic world and the entire world.
The question which I would like to address to our brothers:
What could have been said about the Washington Declaration,
or the treaty, had the issue of Jerusalem been ignored? The is-
sue of Jerusalem will be tackled with time in accordance with
the Palestinian-Israeli accord. We will continue to carry out our
duty toward the holy places until a satisfactory and accepted so-
lution is reached. We only want to do our duty, nothing more
nothing less. At the same time, my personal feeling regarding
the Muslim, Christian, and even the Jewish holy places is that
they should not be placed under the sovereignty of this or that
country, or any side. My personal feeling is that the holy places
should unite all believers in God who should have the same
rights. The Islamic holy places, for example, should belong to
the entire Islamic world. Interfaith dialogue will turn Jerusalem,
this small city and small land, as God wanted it to be, into a
destination for all worshippers. Otherwise, tragedies will recur.
I believe, this view will be accepted by all people and all parties.
This will help solve other problems. Anyhow, sir, the issue is
not in our hands and the responsible side is known. We support
and help, to the best of our ability, the peace process to achieve
its objectives.28
If anything, these statements obscure Jordanian policy. The contradic-
tions and confusion are apparent in every section. The King states that
Jordan is responsible for eastern Jerusalem, yet insists that the Hashemite
Kingdom has no aim or aspiration in Jerusalem; the negotiations about
the permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians will deter-
mine sovereignty over Jerusalem, yet Jordan believes that national-polit-
ical sovereignty over the Holy City should not be given to any of the
contesting parties. He hopes that Jordan will be a party to the permanent
agreements, but states that the Palestinians must come to an agreement
28. FBIS Feb. 21, 1995, at 61-62.
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with Israel. Additionally, the purpose of the peace process is to establish
Palestinian sovereignty over Palestinian soil.
In spite of his statement that Jordan has no aim of its own in Jerusalem,
the Kingdom will continue to supervise the Holy Places during the in-
terim period, as its solemn duty. Although his words indicate a retreat
from the Washington Declaration toward Adnan Abu Odeh's plan,29
Hussein does not state so clearly. In effect, the OIC toppled his entire
strategy. He wrestles with the reality forced upon him, has difficulty in
accepting it, and because Jerusalem's permanent status has not yet been
decided in the debate between Israel and the Palestinians, he still has
hopes of convincing the Islamic countries in the future.
IV. SUMMARY: THE ISLAMIC HOLY PLACES AS A FUNDAMENTALLY
POLITICAL ISSUE
If Israel thought it could outflank the PLO politically by using the reli-
gious card, the Islamic states laid such ideas to rest. In 1974, an Arab
summit meeting removed Jordan from its position as the legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people alongside the PLO; twenty years later
the Islamic countries removed Amman from its preferential position in
the places holy to Islam in Jerusalem.
Fundamentally, the debate among the Islamic states was between two
political alternatives. Jordan was extremely skeptical about the Palestini-
ans' prospects of extracting an agreement from Israel to turn the Palestin-
ian Authority into a state, and thought it even less likely that Israel would
agree to forgo sovereignty in East Jerusalem. Therefore, the Jordanians
reasoned, at the very least Israel should be deprived of its religious hold
on the Islamic Holy Places in the City by separating political from reli-
gious sovereignty. Naturally, this would entail strengthening Jordan's
religious status in the City. But most of the Arab and Islamic states
thought that this would be tantamount to implicit recognition of Israel's
political annexation of East Jerusalem. They insisted that the termination
of Israel's religious hold on the sanctities of Islam in Jerusalem was
bound up inseparably with the termination of the occupation itself. It
followed that the optimal course of action would be to strengthen the
Palestinians and not assent to preferential religious status for Jordan.
The Arab and Islamic states are certain that they will be able to obtain
Israel's agreement to the transformation of the Palestinian Authority into
a state, hence their decision to oust Jordan from its Israeli-conferred pref-
erential status.
29. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing Abu Odeh's plan).
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The fact that the disagreement between Jordan and the Islamic states
was fundamentally political is significant with regard to future administra-
tion of the Islamic Holy Places. It is far from certain that the Islamic
states will agree to exclusive Palestinian administration. The Islamic
states want to end Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and therefore sup-
ported the Palestinian demand. The states have not yet decided who will
administer the Holy Places after Israel transfers East Jerusalem to Pales-
tinian sovereignty. The option of joint religious administration of the Is-
lamic Holy Places in Jerusalem under the political auspices of the
Palestinian regime remains viable.

